9/11/2006 Lecture Notes

1340 Hobbes (2)
The Problem of Order
--The problem being asked by Hobbes is: "How is it that self-interested people can exist together in society when, by violence or by the threat of violence, individuals can be better off by "taking" from others?"

(QUESTION: What are the assumptions contained in this question?)

HOBBES METHOD OF ANSWERING THE HOBBESIAN QUESTION is to imagine government does not exist and to ask: what would happen?

WHAT RESULTS FROM THIS CONCLUSION??? people sensibly recognize they are confronted with a collective disaster and ask: "How can we get out of it?" BUT THEY CANNOT GET OUT OF IT BY ACTING ALONE! WHY?

THEY CANNOT PROMISE TO DO GOOD, because "covenants without the sword are but words and of no strength to secure a man at all." WHY?

Neither can they rely on altruism. WHY?

THEREFORE, THEY HAVE TO MAKE A COLLECTIVE DECISION THAT ALL WILL BE OBLIGED (FORCED) TO KEEP.

IN THE HOBBESIAN STATE OF NATURE and IN THE COMMONS, THERE ARE EXTERNALITIES PRESENT.

The herdsman who adds the extra cow is free riding, those who do not add a cow in that situation are suckers--they do not save the commons but do guarantee themselves a smaller herd.

For Hobbes, the negative externality is the contribution to a "solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short life by the members of the society that comes from every person's own defensive actions.

ARE SUCKERS HEROES?
Being a sucker is not necessarily "bad." or stupid. Society falls apart if all or even many people are free riders. One role for government is to stop people from free riding--by coercing them. Another role is to cause people to cooperate--to be suckers. You might notice that practitioners of religion spend most of their time attempting to convince people to be suckers.

BUT DOES THIS LOGIC MAKE SENSE?

In Small Groups and in Large Groups?

David Hume (another English philosopher) argued that "Two neighbors may agree to drain a meadow, which they possess in common; because 'tis easy for them to know each others mind; and each must perceive that the immediate consequence of his failing in his part, is, the abandoning the whole project. But 'tis very difficult and indeed impossible, that a thousand persons shou'd agree to any such action, it being difficult for them to concert so complicated a design, and still more difficult for them to execute it; while each seeks a pretext to free himself of the trouble and expense and wou'd lay the whole burden on others."

WHAT ARE THE ALTERNATIVES TO HOBBESIAN COERCION?

What forms of coercion are available to non-government entities such as families, churches, lobster fishers, etc?

WHAT DOES ALL THIS MEAN FOR THE DESIGN OF INSTITUTIONS? If we cannot trust in peoples' good intentions in what do we trust
QUESTION: Do people think about the cost of norms?

This question implies that "doing the right thing" can have a price tag attached. Sometimes it can be inexpensive and other times it can be very expensive.

QUESTION: How much pressure must "doing the right thing" be under before it vanishes?

QUESTION: Why do bystanders just stand by when they see someone being beaten, robbed, and even raped? Why don't others stand by? Who is rational?

We can gain some more insight from social psychology. Abraham Maslow suggested there is a hierarchy of needs in which the lower ones have to be satisfied before the higher ones get any attention. His hierarchy of needs:
Self-actualization
Esteem
Belongingness and Love
Safety
Physiological
At the most basic level, people can only (can only afford to??) be concerned with self.
Does that mean that without enough to eat there can be no society?
The higher the level of security the more people (and society) can afford to laugh at themselves. The higher the level of tolerance too.

QUESTION: Do all of one's security needs have to be met before moving up?

QUESTION: Does this hierarchy imply that the individual is/is not selfish?

QUESTION: What do you suppose scarcity of the basics of life might do to people in terms of their pursuit of different levels of this hierarchy?

It is difficult to argue that the "teachers" in the Milgram experiments had any of their basic needs threatened. WHY, THEN, WERE THEY WILLING TO "SHOCK" THE LEARNERS?


QUESTION: WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS OF YOUR ANSWER FOR THE USEFULNESS OF MASLOW'S MODEL OF NEEDS?


All this raises a disturbing question: If collective action (government or more informal systems) is necessary to save us from ourselves in the state of nature, can we trust government to create good incentives instead of bad ones?

QUESTION: WHAT INCENTIVES FACE POLITICAL LEADERS?


QUESTION: ARE WE ANY BETTER OFF TO GET OUT OF THE STATE OF NATURE AND END UP IN THE "OBEDIENCE" STATE?


The tension between order and freedom is ancient and has long been a part of political theory. If you have "too much" order, you run the risk of China's Cultural Revolution. (We'll try, from time to time, to suggest good books. Today's suggested book is Life and Death in Shanghai followed by the movie The Last Emperor. Another great movie on the topic is The Killing Fields. A play worth reading is The Deputy.) On the other hand, if you have too much freedom, you run the risk of life being solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.


Notice that if you choose "mutual coercion, mutually agreed upon," you then have to worry about WHO COERCES THE COERCERS.